The relationship between the West and Wahhabism — the austere, rigid ideology that has been at the core of much contemporary Islamist extremism — is a complex and troubling web of political pragmatism, ideological denial, and strategic compromise.

On the surface, Western nations loudly proclaim their commitment to the values of democracy, pluralism, and human rights, yet their actions often tell a starkly different story.

For decades, their strategic alliances, particularly with Saudi Arabia, have empowered some of the most repressive and radical forces in the Islamic world, allowing the very ideologies that threaten global stability to flourish unchecked.

This article delves into the paradox at the heart of Western foreign policy: the deliberate, unspoken endorsement of Wahhabism in exchange for short-term gains, most notably in the realms of Cold War geopolitics and oil security.

What began as a partnership forged in the crucible of the Cold War quickly evolved into an unspoken pact — one that prioritized immediate, narrow interests over the broader consequences for global security and regional stability.

The West’s alliance with the Saudi monarchy, which actively promotes Wahhabi doctrine at home and abroad, sets the stage for the ideological contagion that continues to fuel terrorism, sectarian violence, and authoritarian repression.

This is not a story of mere unintended consequences. It is one of conscious decisions made by policymakers who chose to ignore the long-term implications of their actions. In their rush to secure oil, counter Soviet influence, and maintain regional stability, they turned a blind eye to the dangerous ideology they were empowering.

The overall outcome has so far been disastrous: a world where extremism is rampant, borders are increasingly porous to militant ideologies, and the fight for justice and human rights is repeatedly undermined by the very powers that claim to champion those causes.

What is at stake is not just the legacy of past mistakes, but the future of global peace and security.

Seeds of an Alliance: Oil, Empire, and Ideology

Pre-Oil Foundations: The British and the Al-Saud-Wahhab Pact

The roots of Western complicity in the rise of Wahhabism stretch back long before the discovery of oil in the Arabian Peninsula. In the early 20th century, the British Empire, facing the growing influence of the Ottoman Empire in the region, sought to establish alliances with local powers that could help counterbalance Ottoman authority.

One such alliance was forged with the Al-Saud family, who, under Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, were consolidating their control over large parts of Arabia. This relationship was solidified in the 1915 Treaty of Darin, in which the British recognized Abdulaziz Ibn Saud as the ruler of Nejd and Hasa in exchange for his allegiance against the Ottomans (Kostiner, 1993).

The British Empire’s support for Ibn Saud was part of a broader strategy to destabilize Ottoman rule, but it also laid the groundwork for the eventual rise of Wahhabism as a dominant force in the region. This partnership was particularly troubling given the historical context in which Ibn Saud’s legitimacy was rooted.

His rule was not only underpinned by military conquests but also by a deep, ideological alliance with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab – the founder of Wahhabism. 

The origins of this pact can be traced to 1744, when the two men formed a mutually beneficial alliance that would shape the course of Saudi Arabia’s history. Wahhabism, which is often framed as a strictly religious movement, was in fact much more than that—it was a political tool wielded by the Al-Saud family to justify their expansionist wars across the Arabian Peninsula.

Under the banner of “purifying” Islam, the Al-Saud family employed Wahhabism as a vehicle to unite disparate tribal groups and legitimize their rule, creating an early fusion of religion and politics that would endure for generations (Al-Rasheed, 2010).

Thus, even before the discovery of oil, the Western powers, particularly Britain, played a pivotal role in shaping the political landscape of the Arabian Peninsula. Their backing of the Al-Saud family and their inferred support for Wahhabism contributed to the entrenchment of an ideology that would later become a major influence on regional politics and global security, particularly as oil wealth began to transform the kingdom’s strategic importance. 

This early historical context underscores the long-standing relationship between the West and Wahhabism—one that was forged out of political calculation but would ultimately fuel the rise of forces that continue to destabilize the region today.

Oil Discovery and the U.S.-Saudi Entanglement

The discovery of oil in Dhahran in 1938 fundamentally shifted Saudi Arabia’s position on the global stage, transforming it into a critical geopolitical player. Standard Oil of California, which later became Aramco, secured extraction rights to the vast oil reserves in the kingdom, ensuring that Saudi Arabia would become a key supplier of oil to the West.

This discovery coincided with an increasingly strategic U.S. interest in the region, particularly given the need for access to oil during World War II. This relationship was formalized in 1945 with the Quincy Pact, signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz, which established an enduring U.S.-Saudi alliance.

Under the terms of the pact, the United States committed to providing military protection for the Saudi monarchy in exchange for unfettered access to Saudi oil reserves (Yergin, 1991).

What made this arrangement dangerous was the Saudi monarchy’s insistence on propagating Wahhabism as a condition of its rule. The U.S., prioritizing Cold War alliances, overlooked the ideology’s inherent intolerance.

The Cold War Calculus: Wahhabism as an Anti-Communist Tool

By the height of the Cold War, Saudi Arabia had become a cornerstone of U.S. strategy in the Middle East. The kingdom’s geopolitical significance was reinforced not only by its oil reserves but also by its pivotal role in countering Soviet expansion.

As the Cold War intensified, the U.S. saw Saudi Arabia as a crucial ally in a region where Soviet-backed leftist movements, particularly in countries like Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, threatened to shift the political and economic balance.

In this context, Saudi Arabia’s brand of conservatism, rooted in Wahhabism, was viewed by the U.S. as a stabilizing force against the spread of secularism and communism. The Saudi monarchy, understanding the strategic importance of its alliance with Washington, seized the opportunity to expand its religious influence abroad. Wahhabism, with its anti-secular and conservative values, became a key ideological tool in the broader Cold War struggle.

While the U.S. government was deeply focused on containing Soviet influence, it did not prioritize addressing the internal religious policies of Saudi Arabia, even if they were rooted in extremism. The growing spread of Wahhabism, seen as a fortification against Marxist ideologies, was not only tolerated but implicitly supported as part of the larger effort to halt communist expansion.

In the 1960s, Saudi Arabia began to actively export Wahhabism through organizations such as the Muslim World League (MWL) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), both funded by the Saudi government. These entities facilitated the spread of Wahhabi teachings to countries experiencing communist uprisings or social revolutions, turning the export of Wahhabism into a key component of the U.S.-Saudi partnership in the Cold War (Alterman, 2004).

As Saudi Arabia poured resources into this global campaign, it found an ally in Washington, which viewed the spread of Wahhabism as beneficial in the fight against Soviet-backed socialism in the Arab world, Central Asia, and parts of Africa. Saudi Arabia’s vast wealth allowed it to fund Islamic groups, many of which were engaged in direct combat with Soviet forces.

The most prominent example of this was the Soviet-Afghan War, where the U.S. and Saudi Arabia worked together to support the mujahideen, many of whom adhered to Wahhabi teachings. A declassified 1985 CIA memo reflects the U.S. government’s stance in this, stating:

“The stability of the Saudi regime is paramount, and its religious policies are an internal matter.”

This statement highlights the U.S. prioritization of short-term geopolitical stability over concerns about the long-term effects of supporting an extreme ideological movement. 

Though the strategy of using Wahhabism to counter communism served short-term U.S. interests, it set the stage for long-term instability in the Muslim world.

The U.S.’s failure to recognize the corrosive effects of Wahhabi extremism paved the way for the rise of militant movements that misrepresent both Islam and the concept of jihad (struggle in the path of God), ultimately contributing to the global threat posed by violent interpretations of these distorted beliefs.

This long-term consequence would challenge both regional and international security in the years to come.

A Global Campaign to Export Extremism

Petrodollar Islam: The 1970s Surge

The 1973 oil embargo and subsequent price surge—a response by Arab oil producers to Western support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War—gave Saudi Arabia vast financial power, enabling the kingdom to invest billions in spreading Wahhabism worldwide. 

Saudi-funded mosques, madrasas, and Islamic centers became hubs for promoting its strict interpretation of Islam. This global campaign, targeting regions like South Asia and Europe, shifted the religious landscape, replacing traditional teachings with Wahhabi doctrine.

While this expanded Saudi influence, it also fueled sectarian tensions and contributed to the rise of radical ideologies, shaping political and religious dynamics that continue to affect the Muslim world today.

Pakistan

In Pakistan, Saudi Arabia has played a significant role in reshaping the religious landscape, particularly through its funding of madrassas, or religious seminaries. Since the 1980s—especially during the Afghan jihad era—Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in institutions promoting a strict, literalist interpretation of Islam rooted in Wahhabism.

This influx of influence began to shift the balance away from the country’s more diverse religious traditions, including Sufi-inspired practices and other indigenous Sunni and Shia schools, steering religious education toward a more rigid, conservative orientation aligned with Saudi geopolitical interests.

The spread of Wahhabi doctrines through these seminaries has had profound implications for Pakistan’s religious and social fabric. Wahhabism, with its strict, puritanical views, has been linked to the rise of sectarianism, particularly between Sunni and Shia Muslims. The Wahhabi curriculum in these seminaries often portrays Shia Muslims as heretics, deepening sectarian divides in a country already prone to religious conflict.

In many cases, these teachings have fueled extremist ideologies, contributing to the growth of militant groups that align themselves with Saudi-inspired interpretations of Islam.

The influence of Saudi-funded seminaries has also had political consequences, as the rise of Wahhabi thought has affected not only religious practices but also Pakistan’s broader national politics. The spread of these rigid doctrines has led to a more polarized society, with increasing tensions between various religious communities.

The madrassas themselves, which are often poorly regulated and receive limited oversight, have sometimes served as breeding grounds for radicalization, providing recruits for militant organizations that engage in violence both within Pakistan and across the wider region.

As documented by scholar Muhammad Abbas, the rise of Saudi-funded seminaries in Pakistan was not just a religious shift but a strategic effort by Saudi Arabia to export its interpretation of Islam as part of a broader geopolitical agenda (Abbas, 2015).

Bosnia

During the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Bosnia significantly influenced the country’s religious dynamics. As the war intensified, Saudi charities, many of which were backed by the Saudi government, began channeling funds into Bosnia.

These charities provided humanitarian aid but also supported radical Islamic groups and introduced Salafi ideologies to a population that had traditionally adhered to a more moderate and inclusive form of Islam, influenced by both Hanafi Sunni and Sufi practices.

Before the war, Bosnian Muslims, or Bosniaks, followed a tradition of Islam that emphasized inclusivity, tolerance, and local customs, which contrasted with the rigid Salafi interpretation that Saudi-backed groups sought to promote. With the influx of foreign fighters and funding, particularly from the Middle East, Salafism began to take root in parts of the Bosnian Muslim community.

This ideological shift was supported by Saudi-funded mosques, Islamic schools, and social services that adhered to Salafi teachings.

This shift created tension between the traditionally moderate Muslim population and those adopting more conservative Salafi beliefs. Saudi-backed groups not only sought to spread Salafi doctrine but also played a role in establishing networks that would later be tied to extremist groups, such as Al-Qaeda.

As Bougarel (2017) points out, this religious transformation was not merely a byproduct of the war but part of a larger strategy by Saudi Arabia to extend its influence in the Balkans, especially following the collapse of Yugoslavia.

The introduction of Salafi ideologies contributed to divisions within Bosnian society, altering the religious landscape and complicating post-war reconstruction.

While some Bosnian Muslims embraced these foreign influences, others resisted, creating ongoing tensions about the role of foreign-backed religious ideologies in shaping Bosnia’s Muslim community.

The impact of Saudi funding during this period has left a lasting legacy, contributing to the emergence of a more radicalized fringe within Bosnia’s Muslim population, which has been linked to broader regional and global security concerns.

The role of Saudi charities in this process highlights how foreign intervention in religious matters can deeply affect a nation’s social and political dynamics, often in ways that extend far beyond the original intentions (Bougarel, 2017).

Western Europe

In Western Europe, Saudi-backed institutions have played a significant role in shaping the religious and political landscape, sometimes with unintended or troubling consequences. One such institution is the Islamic Cultural Center of Brussels (ICCB), which has been linked to the spread of extremist ideologies.

Established with the support of the Saudi government, the ICCB was initially intended to serve as a cultural and religious center for the Muslim community in Belgium. However, over time, it became a focal point for the dissemination of Wahhabi teachings.

The influence of Saudi-backed institutions like the ICCB is especially concerning given their role in recruiting young Muslims who may feel alienated or marginalized in Western societies. The center became a known hub for extremist recruitment, providing a platform for radical clerics and ideologues who preached Wahhabism and promoted an interpretation of Islam that is often at odds with the values of tolerance and pluralism upheld by many European societies.

These extremist preachers not only fostered an environment conducive to radicalization but also facilitated connections with other extremist networks, both within Europe and beyond.

Vidino (2020) highlights that such institutions are part of a broader pattern where Saudi-backed organizations operate as instruments of soft power, seeking to influence Muslim communities abroad by promoting a particular ideological narrative.

While the official narrative of these institutions is often framed around religious education and community engagement, the underlying agenda can sometimes include fostering a worldview that is more aligned with Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi agenda than with the diverse religious traditions of the countries in which these institutions are based.

The existence of these centers, and the role they play in the radicalization process, raises difficult questions about the extent to which foreign powers can influence domestic security and integration in Western countries. The ICCB’s connection to extremist elements is not an isolated case but part of a broader trend of Saudi influence in Western Europe, where similar institutions in other countries have also been accused of promoting radical ideologies.

In the context of rising concerns about terrorism and domestic security, the presence of such Saudi-backed institutions in Europe continues to be a source of tension and debate over how to balance religious freedom with national security (Vidino, 2020).

The Afghan Jihad: Birth of the Modern Jihadist

The 1979 Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan marked a turning point. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia jointly funded the mujahideen, with Saudi intelligence funneling money—often indirectly—through Osama bin Laden and the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), which he co-founded with Abdullah Azzam to recruit and finance foreign fighters for the Afghan jihad (Coll, 2004).

MAK served as a key logistical and financial hub, channeling donations from wealthy Gulf donors to Islamist fighters. Though not officially part of the Saudi government, bin Laden operated with quiet approval and support from segments of the kingdom’s intelligence establishment.

This collaboration helped elevate him as a prominent figure in the jihadist movement long before the emergence of al-Qaeda.

The CIA’s Operation Cyclone, which channeled billions to Afghan fighters, relied heavily on Saudi matching funds. The unintended consequence was the creation of a transnational jihadist network steeped in Wahhabi ideology.

“We were fighting the Soviets, but we were also creating a monster.”
— Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. National Security Advisor (1977–1981) (Brzezinski, 1998)

By the 1990s, veterans of the Afghan war — steeped in Saudi-funded extremism — formed the nucleus of al-Qaeda.

Wahhabism’s Internal Target: The Shias

Sectarian Persecution in Saudi Arabia

Wahhabism’s most immediate victims were fellow Muslims, specifically the Shia minority in Saudi Arabia. This minority, which comprises approximately 10-15% of the population, has faced long-standing systemic discrimination within the kingdom. The persecution of Shia Muslims has been both social and institutional, reinforced by state policies, religious discourse, and violent acts of repression.

One of the most visible forms of persecution has been the public execution of Shia clerics, who have often been targeted for challenging the state’s interpretation of Islam or for advocating for the rights of the Shia community.

A high-profile example of this occurred in 2016 when Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr was executed by the Saudi government. His execution sparked widespread international outrage, as al-Nimr had been an outspoken critic of the Saudi regime and a symbol of Shia resistance within the kingdom (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

Human Rights Watch has documented the systemic abuse of Shia rights in the kingdom, noting that al-Nimr’s death epitomized the violent repression faced by Shia activists in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi state views these Shia clerics as threats to the political and religious unity of the country, leading to their arrest, torture, and execution.

In addition to executions, the destruction of Shia mosques and husseiniyas (Shia places of worship and community gathering) has been a common occurrence in Saudi Arabia. These actions are seen as part of the broader effort by the Saudi state to erase the religious and cultural identity of the Shia community.

The Saudi government has often justified the demolition of these structures as part of a campaign to maintain the purity of Islamic worship, adhering to Wahhabi principles that view Shia practices, such as the commemoration of Ashura, as innovations (bid’ah) that deviate from the “true” path of Islam.

The systematic destruction of Shia religious sites is not just an attack on religious freedom but a means to further isolate and delegitimize the Shia minority.

Moreover, the state-sanctioned Wahhabi clerics have played a significant role in fostering sectarian hatred within Saudi society. These clerics, who wield considerable influence over both religious and political affairs in the kingdom, have consistently labeled Shia Muslims as “worse than Jews and Christians” (Al-Rasheed, 2010).

Such inflammatory rhetoric has been used to justify discrimination, marginalization, and violence against Shia communities, both within Saudi Arabia and in other parts of the Muslim world.

The portrayal of Shia Islam as a deviant sect has been a key element in the Wahhabi agenda to consolidate Sunni dominance in the kingdom and across the region, further deepening sectarian divides.

The systemic nature of this persecution is a direct reflection of the ideological power that Wahhabism holds in Saudi Arabia. It is not only a theological dispute but also a political strategy, as the Saudi state uses sectarianism to reinforce its own authority and legitimacy.

To this day, the marginalized Shia community remains a target of oppression in a country where adherence to Wahhabi doctrine is seen as essential for political and social cohesion.

In summary, the sectarian persecution of Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia represents a tragic and enduring aspect of the kingdom’s internal policies, heavily influenced by the tenets of Wahhabism. The state’s use of public executions, the destruction of religious sites, and the incitement of hatred through clerical statements all contribute to the ongoing discrimination faced by the Shia minority.

This reflects the broader political and religious dynamics that shape the kingdom’s relationship with its non-Sunni population (Al-Rasheed, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2017).

Global Sectarian Warfare

Saudi Arabia’s financial backing of militant groups and sectarian factions has contributed to widespread anti-Shia violence across several other countries.

In Pakistan, Saudi-funded groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) were responsible for carrying out massacres against the Shia Hazaras, a minority group in the country. These attacks were part of a broader campaign of sectarian violence fueled by Wahhabi-inspired ideologies, which Saudi Arabia had actively supported (International Crisis Group, 2005).

The violence against the Hazaras has been widely condemned as a result of the intense sectarian hatred stoked by these Saudi-backed groups, further exacerbating religious divisions in Pakistan.

In Iraq, following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, Saudi clerics played a key role in inciting Sunni militants against the Shia majority. The Saudi-backed rhetoric depicted Shia Muslims as deviants of Islam, which in turn, fueled the rise of militant groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

This sectarian incitement laid the ideological groundwork for the eventual formation of ISIS, a group that built its power by exploiting Sunni-Shia tensions (Weiss & Hassan, 2015).

Saudi Arabia’s support for these sectarian narratives contributed to the deepening of Iraq’s post-invasion instability and the rise of extremism in the region.

In Yemen, the Saudi-led coalition’s war against Ansar Allah, a Zaidi Shia group, has been framed as a sectarian conflict. Saudi Arabia’s rhetoric cast Ansar Allah as an existential threat to Sunni Arab states, presenting the war as a crusade against Shia Islam. This narrative has been used to justify the military intervention, which has resulted in widespread destruction and civilian casualties (UN Panel of Experts, 2021).

The framing of the war in sectarian terms has not only fueled violence in Yemen but also escalated tensions between Sunni and Shia communities across the broader Middle East.

In essence, Saudi Arabia’s financing and backing of sectarian groups and militias have been key drivers in fueling anti-Shia violence across multiple countries beyond its own borders. Whether in Pakistan, Iraq, or Yemen, this support has contributed to deepening sectarian divides and further destabilizing regions already vulnerable to conflict.

Strategic Blindness: The Cost of Selective Vision

9/11 and the Unacknowledged Connections

Fifteen of the 19 hijackers involved in the September 11 attacks were Saudi nationals, which alone raises serious questions about the kingdom’s indirect role in the tragedy.

Declassified FBI documents from 2007 exposed significant ties between high-ranking Saudi officials and members of al-Qaeda, suggesting that the connections between the Saudi state and the terrorist group were far more extensive than previously acknowledged. Despite this, the U.S. government took a deliberate step to suppress key information, redacting 28 pages of the 9/11 Commission Report, which dealt directly with the involvement of Saudi Arabia.

This redaction has fueled widespread speculation and distrust, particularly among the victims’ families and independent analysts, who argue that the withholding of this information reflects a calculated effort to shield powerful allies from accountability.

The U.S. government’s failure to fully disclose these details has sparked an ongoing debate about the true nature of the Saudi relationship with al-Qaeda and raised concerns about transparency in addressing such a significant chapter of global terrorism (9/11 Commission Report, 2004).

The Yemen Catastrophe

Since 2015, Saudi Arabia has waged a brutal and ongoing war in Yemen, a conflict that has caused immense suffering and devastation to the civilian population. With support from the U.S. and UK, the Saudi-led coalition has bombed civilian infrastructure, resulting in a significant number of civilian deaths.

The war has also given rise to widespread cholera epidemics, fueled by the destruction of vital health infrastructure and the collapse of basic sanitation systems. Additionally, starvation has been used as a weapon of war, with Saudi Arabia imposing blockades that restrict access to food, medicine, and essential goods, as documented by Amnesty International in 2019.

Despite the dire humanitarian consequences, Western nations continue to back Saudi Arabia militarily, with the U.S. approving an estimated $110 billion in weapons sales to the Kingdom under the Trump administration (Congressional Research Service, 2020).

This ongoing support is emblematic of the West’s willingness to prioritize geopolitical and economic interests over human rights and international law, further complicating the narrative of the West’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and its role in the perpetuation of conflict and suffering in the region.

The West’s Duplicity: Condemning the Monster It Fed

The Hypocrisy of Counterterrorism

While the U.S. designates groups like Hezbollah and Hamas as terrorist organizations, it avoids applying the same label to Saudi-funded Wahhabi clerics. The rhetoric and extremist doctrines advocated by these clerics often call for violence against non-believers and justify the persecution of sectarian groups, yet they remain largely insulated from such designations.

This discrepancy highlights a stark contradiction in U.S. counterterrorism policies, where strategic alliances with Saudi Arabia—regardless of the dangerous ideology it fosters—take precedence over confronting ideologies that directly contribute to real terrorism.

Silence in Western Capitals

Over the years, the Al-Saud ruling family of Saudi Arabia has donated millions of dollars to prestigious British universities, such as Oxford and Cambridge, to fund research, scholarships, and academic programs.

One of the most notable areas of focus for these donations has been the Middle East studies programs, which are often pivotal in shaping how the region is studied, understood, and represented in the Western academic world.

These contributions raise important questions about the influence that a foreign power, particularly one with such an interest in maintaining a certain narrative, can exert on academic research and discourse. Critics argue that this financial support has led to a potential conflict of interest, with scholars and institutions becoming financially dependent on the very government whose actions they may be expected to critically examine.

Some critics contend that this influence has resulted in more favorable portrayals of Saudi Arabia’s role in the region, as well as a minimization of its human rights record and its involvement in various geopolitical conflicts.

This practice is not unique to the UK but extends to other Western nations as well, where similar donations are used to shape the educational environment surrounding Middle Eastern politics.

The donations may also fund research into issues that serve Saudi interests, whether directly or indirectly, allowing the Al-Saud family to exert soft power by steering academic focus away from critical issues, such as the monarchy’s internal policies, its role in funding extremist ideologies, or its involvement in regional conflicts.

This pattern of philanthropy, therefore, illustrates how strategic investments in education serve as tools of influence and are part of Saudi Arabia’s broader effort to shape global perceptions and maintain its image on the world stage, particularly in Western circles (The Guardian, 2018).

In the United States, think tanks play a pivotal role in shaping policy debates and influencing public opinion on key geopolitical issues. Among these, the Middle East Forum stands out as a notable player.

This think tank, which focuses on issues related to the Middle East, has been a recipient of significant financial support from Saudi sources – support that has allowed the forum to produce research, hold events, and provide policy recommendations that align with the interests of its benefactors.

This financial relationship raises concerns about the potential for conflicts of interest and the degree to which policy recommendations may be influenced by Saudi Arabia’s strategic goals. 

The Middle East Forum’s output, which often emphasizes the importance of countering Iran’s influence in the region and portrays Saudi Arabia in a more favorable light, exemplifies how foreign funding can shape the narratives presented in policy discussions.

By providing financial backing, Saudi Arabia has been able to ensure that certain viewpoints receive greater attention and legitimacy in the U.S. policy arena, potentially marginalizing more critical perspectives on the kingdom’s human rights record, its role in regional conflicts, and its funding of extremist ideologies.

This practice is part of a broader trend where foreign governments with strategic interests in shaping U.S. policy funnel money into think tanks, advocacy groups, and academic institutions to promote their preferred narratives. For Saudi Arabia, this investment serves to solidify its position as a key ally of the U.S. in the Middle East while downplaying controversies surrounding its domestic policies and international actions.

The Intercept’s investigation into the matter sheds light on how such financial ties can blur the lines between independent research and foreign influence, raising critical questions about the integrity and objectivity of policy debates in Washington (The Intercept, 2017).

A Path Forward?

Breaking the cycle of violence and ideological radicalism tied to Wahhabism requires more than rhetoric — it demands policy decisions grounded in accountability, transparency, and a genuine commitment to multiplicity. For decades, strategic expediency led the West to prioritize alliances with Gulf regimes, even when those same regimes were fueling extremism across the globe. If lessons are to be learned, they must now inform a new direction.

One necessary step is to condition arms sales on the end of extremist funding. Western nations have continued to supply billions of dollars’ worth of advanced weaponry to Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies, despite well-documented evidence of these regimes exporting ultra-conservative interpretations of Islam through madrassas, satellite channels, and seemingly charitable organizations.

By tying future arms deals to measurable efforts in dismantling these ideological networks, the West can begin to hold its allies to the same standards it applies elsewhere. This isn’t unprecedented — arms sales to other nations have long been subject to human rights benchmarks. The same must now apply to states whose influence contributes to global radicalization.

A second measure involves declassifying documents related to Saudi Arabia’s potential links to the 9/11 attacks. While some files have been partially unsealed in recent years, many key records remain redacted. Full transparency would not only honor the right of the victims’ families to know the truth, but also help the public understand the real cost of prioritizing economic ties over national and global security.

The myth of benign Gulf-Western relations has long shielded these partnerships from scrutiny. Declassification would expose the long-term consequences of ignoring ideological sponsorship for the sake of short-term diplomacy.

Finally, it is time for the West to support pluralistic Islamic movements — not through interference, but by fostering conditions where diverse and indigenous interpretations of Islam can flourish. For decades, mainstream Shia voices, Sufi orders, and reformist Sunni scholars have been marginalized while authoritarian and often Wahhabi-aligned regimes received financial and political backing.

Encouraging the visibility of these alternative movements — many of which promote coexistence, civil society, and spiritual resilience — offers a sustainable counterweight to radical narratives. This doesn’t require imposing foreign agendas but rather, by ceasing support for those who stifle theological diversity at home and export intolerance abroad.

Until such measures are taken seriously, the blowback of past policies will continue to reverberate — in the form of terrorism, fractured societies, and disillusioned populations. Acknowledging the mistakes of history is only the beginning. Changing course, with clear, tangible action, is the only way forward.

Until then, the cycle of blowback will continue.

References

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