When it comes to nuclear policy, few topics reveal the sheer scale of geopolitical double standards like the treatment of Iran’s nuclear program.

The United States—the only nation in history to have used nuclear weapons in war—positions itself as the world’s moral authority on non-proliferation.

Meanwhile, Israel, an undeclared nuclear power that has never signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), continues to operate under a veil of opacity, refusing international inspections or public acknowledgment of its own arsenal.

Yet both nations have led—and continue to lead—global efforts to restrict Iran’s nuclear development, citing fears of regional instability and potential weaponization.

This pressure persists despite Iran being a signatory to the NPT, subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight, and having repeatedly declared its nuclear intentions as peaceful—even remaining in the JCPOA after the U.S. unilaterally withdrew in 2018.

The contradiction is glaring. Washington, with its legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Tel Aviv, with its clandestine arsenal and refusal to join key arms control treaties, both demand transparency and restraint from Iran.

The historical, legal, and strategic hypocrisies embedded in U.S. and Israeli nuclear posturing, in light of ongoing events, necessitate analysis—and reveal the selective morality of international power politics.

A Legacy of Selective Deterrence

In August 1945, the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing over 200,000 people, mostly civilians.

These bombings were justified under the guise of hastening the end of World War II—an alternative to the proposed Allied invasion of mainland Japan—but they also served a second, unspoken purpose: demonstrating American military supremacy and technology to the world, especially the Soviet Union.

Since then, the U.S. has maintained one of the largest and most sophisticated nuclear arsenals on Earth, while also engaging in a decades-long campaign to prevent others from acquiring similar capabilities.

This campaign has often been arbitrary and politically motivated. Allies with nuclear ambitions—such as India and Pakistan—have largely escaped the wrath of U.S. sanctions. Meanwhile, countries viewed as threats to U.S. hegemony, like Iran and North Korea, face harsh penalties, sabotage efforts, and even threats of war.

Israel and Nuclear Hypocrisy

Israel’s nuclear history is even more shrouded in secrecy. Beginning in the late 1950s, with covert support from France and quiet acquiescence from the U.S., Israel constructed a nuclear facility in Dimona under the pretense of civilian research.

By the late 1960s, it had reportedly developed nuclear weapons, yet it has never confirmed their existence.

This policy of nuclear opacity—neither confirming nor denying its arsenal—has allowed Israel to avoid international scrutiny while enjoying the benefits of strategic deterrence.

Unlike Iran, Israel is not a signatory to the NPT. It has also refused to ratify key treaties such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and it is believed to possess between 80 and 400 nuclear warheads.

Despite this, the U.S. has never seriously challenged Israel’s nuclear status—in fact, it has actively helped shield it from international pressure.

This double standard is not just diplomatic hypocrisy; it’s a deliberate reinforcement of a global order in which some states are allowed to possess nuclear weapons unchecked, while others are punished for even pursuing the capacity to enrich uranium.

Legality, Treaties, and the Nuclear Rules-Based Order

At the heart of the nuclear debate lies the NPT, signed in 1968 and enforced since 1970. The NPT rests on a simple premise: countries without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire them, while countries with them work toward disarmament. In return, all signatories have the right to pursue peaceful nuclear energy under strict monitoring by the IAEA.

Iran is a signatory to the NPT. Despite decades of suspicion, its nuclear program remains under continuous IAEA inspection, and to date, no verified evidence has confirmed that Iran has developed or deployed a nuclear weapon.

In fact, under the 2015 JCPOA, Iran accepted unprecedented restrictions on its enrichment program and opened its facilities to the most intrusive inspections ever imposed on a sovereign state.

But in 2018, it was the United States—not Iran—that broke the deal, unilaterally withdrawing and reimposing sanctions in violation of international consensus.

Israel, on the other hand, exists entirely outside this framework. It has never signed the NPT, never subjected its nuclear program to IAEA oversight, and continues to reject calls to join other global disarmament treaties. It is believed to possess a stockpile of between 80 and 400 nuclear warheads, developed in secret with early French assistance and protected ever since by a U.S.-Israel policy of deliberate ambiguity.

This legal exceptionalism is not just theoretical—it has had dangerous real-world implications.

During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, with Egyptian and Syrian forces pushing into Israeli-held territory, Israel’s leadership reportedly prepared 13 nuclear bombs for possible use.

According to investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, and later confirmed by declassified documents and academic analyses, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan advocated a nuclear strike on Cairo, Damascus, and even Baghdad if conventional forces failed to turn the tide. Only after a massive American resupply effort stabilized Israel’s position did the nuclear option recede.

The fact that a non-signatory state, operating with zero international oversight, considered nuclear strikes on neighboring capitals should be a critical concern in any serious non-proliferation discourse.

Yet this episode—like Israel’s entire nuclear program—remains largely unspoken in Western policymaking circles, even as those same actors demand absolute transparency and restraint from Tehran.

Eroding Global Trust in a Two-Tier Nuclear World

The United States and Israel portray themselves as guardians of international security, warning of the catastrophic consequences should Iran ever obtain nuclear weapons.

Yet their actions tell a different story—one in which nuclear weapons are tools of deterrence, coercion, and silent privilege — only for those who already possess them or fall within Washington’s strategic embrace.

This double standard has not gone unnoticed. Across the Global South and beyond, many nations view the U.S.-Israeli posture not as principled non-proliferation but as cynical power politics.

Why, they ask, should some countries be bound by strict treaties and inspections while others violate them with impunity or avoid them altogether? Why is Iran sanctioned for enriching uranium—an activity permitted under the NPT—while Israel is rewarded militarily and diplomatically for its undeclared arsenal?

Such contradictions weaken the credibility of the entire non-proliferation regime. If international law is applied selectively, it ceases to be law and becomes a tool of domination. Worse still, the erosion of trust in institutions like the IAEA, the United Nations, and the NPT itself fuels a dangerous logic: that security comes not through compliance, but through defiance and deterrence.

In this climate, the moral authority of the U.S. and its allies to police nuclear behavior is in steep decline. What’s left is a hollow performance—demanding disarmament from others while clinging to nuclear supremacy and shielding allies from scrutiny.

Until this imbalance is confronted honestly, efforts to prevent proliferation will remain undermined by the very powers claiming to uphold them.